| Popis: |
The tension between the central government and the federating units has always been an intractable issue between the forces of centralization and decentralization in a federalism with the judiciary at the intersection of the conflict. Therefore, this study examines judicial interpretation in resolving the conflict on jurisdiction between the central government and the federating units. It applies Henri Lefebvre’s theory of space, Richard Ford’s analysis of jurisdiction, Benjamin Cardozo’s and Oliver Wendell Holmes’s psychology of judging to judicial interpretation in resolving the conflict on jurisdiction between the central government and the federating units. It finds that the justices on the majority and the minority who interpret the constitution to resolve questions of jurisdiction between the central government and the federating units often play politics of space hidden within the interstices of legal rules without being conscious of their psychological biases. Hence, it argues that instead of playing politics of space, what the justices should do is to apply the principles in Keynesian federalism bolstered by the rule of presumption. With this, the influence of politics borne of psychological biases can be reduced while both the central government and the federating units are given equal chances. In conclusion, it recommends that whenever the judges are called upon to resolve the conflict between the central government and the federating units, the principle in Keynesian federalism with the rule of presumption should be applied. |
