Collective behavior in the Stackelberg model under incomplete information
| Autor: | Daria G. Algazina, Gennady I. Algazin |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Marginal cost
0209 industrial biotechnology Collective behavior Computer science 010102 general mathematics 02 engineering and technology Competitor analysis ComputingMethodologies_ARTIFICIALINTELLIGENCE 01 natural sciences 020901 industrial engineering & automation Control and Systems Engineering Complete information Stackelberg competition 0101 mathematics Electrical and Electronic Engineering Mathematical economics Event (probability theory) |
| Zdroj: | Automation and Remote Control. 78:1619-1630 |
| ISSN: | 1608-3032 0005-1179 |
| DOI: | 10.1134/s0005117917090077 |
| Popis: | We present the Stackelberg model with linear demand and cost functions for the agents where the leader agent and follower agents have imprecise initial information regarding the marginal costs of competitors. Agents dynamically refine their perceptions and actions based on observing the actions other agents. We obtain necessary and sufficient conditions of the event that the dynamic converges to a Stackelberg equilibrium with true values of marginal costs. We also clarify the situations when agents cannot come to an equilibrium. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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