How Do Money and Time Restrictions Influence Self-Constraining Behavior in Polluting the Commons?
| Autor: | Katherine D. Arbuthnott, Andrea Scerbe |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Consumption (economics)
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management Public economics 05 social sciences Global commons 050109 social psychology 050105 experimental psychology Shared resource Social group Dilemma Sustainable management Economics 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Commons General Environmental Science Waste disposal |
| Zdroj: | Organization & Environment. 30:211-225 |
| ISSN: | 1552-7417 1086-0266 |
| DOI: | 10.1177/1086026616652667 |
| Popis: | Commons are resources shared by a group of people, and are studied using the commons dilemma paradigm. Despite Hardin’s prediction that the only sustainable management options are government regulation or private ownership, sustainable commons management has been observed with unregulated groups; however, global commons such as the atmosphere and oceans seem to conform to the prediction of “tragedy” because self-interests among users lead to degradation of the commons through overuse. The present study examined whether the factors of commons type (consumption or waste disposal) and cost (money or time) influence individual self-constraint in harvesting/polluting decisions to prolong the longevity of the shared resource, in the absence of social communication. Results indicate an interaction of the two factors: Individual self-constraint was greatest with the combination of disposal commons and time cost. These findings suggest that creative strategies to manage global commons may be possible, at least for waste-disposal commons. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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