CEO retirement compensation: Is inside debt excess compensation or a risk management tool?
| Autor: | Colin D. Reid |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Marketing
Finance 050208 finance Scrutiny Executive compensation ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION business.industry media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Equity (finance) Deferred compensation 050201 accounting Incentive Economic inequality Debt 0502 economics and business Business and International Management business Risk management media_common |
| Zdroj: | Business Horizons. 61:721-731 |
| ISSN: | 0007-6813 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.bushor.2018.05.004 |
| Popis: | CEOs face constant scrutiny over their compensation packages. This scrutiny has only intensified amid discussions of CEO-to-employee pay ratios and income inequality nationwide. CEO retirement packages are criticized as camouflage compensation used to award excessive compensation to CEOs and were, prior to 2006, less transparent than they are now. Thanks to the transparent disclosures now required by the SEC, we have a better understanding of the types and amounts of compensation owed to CEOs after they depart or retire, termed inside debt. I investigate whether all CEO inside debt components share similar incentive effects and offers some thoughts on how companies might structure these packages to be most effective. I discuss the structure and incentive effects of the two primary components of inside debt: deferred compensation and supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs). I explain why inside debt, particularly CEO SERPs, may actually help companies manage firm risk. Finally, I outline the best ways to structure inside debt so that it functions as a resource to manage firm risk and foster a long-term perspective rather than mirroring the incentive effect of equity, increasing risk, and encouraging a myopic focus. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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