Rationalizing Irrational Beliefs
| Autor: | Ruqu Wang, Geoffrey R. Dunbar, Xiaoting Wang |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Sequential equilibrium 05 social sciences ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING TheoryofComputation_GENERAL 02 engineering and technology Subgame perfect equilibrium Extensive-form game symbols.namesake Markov perfect equilibrium Equilibrium selection Nash equilibrium 0502 economics and business 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Economics symbols 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing 050207 economics Solution concept Mathematical economics Centipede game |
| Zdroj: | Theoretical Economics Letters. :1219-1229 |
| ISSN: | 2162-2086 2162-2078 |
| DOI: | 10.4236/tel.2016.66115 |
| Popis: | In this paper we propose a “behavioral equilibrium” definition for a class of dynamic games of perfect information. We document various experimental studies of the Centipede Game in the literature that demonstrate that players rarely follow the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. Although some theoretical modifications have been proposed to explain the outcomes of the experiments, we offer another: players can choose whether or not to believe that their opponents use subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. We define a “behavioral equilibrium” for this game; using this equilibrium concept, we can reproduce the outcomes of those experiments. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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