Why Are Some Phenomenal Experiences ‘Vivid’ and Others ‘Faint’? Representationalism, Imagery, and Cognitive Phenomenology
| Autor: | David Bourget |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Cognitive science
media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Metaphysics Cognition 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Direct and indirect realism 050105 experimental psychology Philosophy Perception 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Consciousness Psychology Phenomenology (psychology) media_common |
| Zdroj: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 95:673-687 |
| ISSN: | 1471-6828 0004-8402 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/00048402.2017.1278612 |
| Popis: | One central brand of representationalism claims that the specific phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its content. A challenge for this view is that cognitive and perceptual experiences sometimes seem to have the same representational content while differing in phenomenal character. In particular, it might seem that one can have faint imagery experiences or conscious thoughts with the same contents as vivid perceptual experiences. This paper argues that such cases never arise, and that they are probably metaphysically impossible. I also suggest a fully representational account of differences in vividness between phenomenal experiences. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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