A note on optimal allocation with costly verification
| Autor: | Andreas Kleiner, Albin Erlanson |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Economics and Econometrics Mathematical optimization Computer science Applied Mathematics 05 social sciences Bayesian probability Principal (computer security) Optimal mechanism Incentive compatibility Simple (abstract algebra) 0502 economics and business Optimal allocation 050206 economic theory Equivalence (measure theory) 050205 econometrics |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Mathematical Economics. 84:56-62 |
| ISSN: | 0304-4068 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.06.002 |
| Popis: | We revisit the problem of a principal allocating an indivisible good with costly verification, as it was formulated and analyzed by Ben-Porath et al. (2014). We establish, in this setting, a general equivalence between Bayesian and ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms. We also provide a simple proof showing that the optimal mechanism is a threshold mechanism. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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