Conditional coercion versus rights diagnostics
Autor: | Scott Wisor |
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Rok vydání: | 2016 |
Předmět: |
021110 strategic
defence & security studies Economics and Econometrics Sociology and Political Science Human rights Reservation of rights media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies Fundamental rights 02 engineering and technology Rights of Nature Right to property 0506 political science Philosophy Politics International human rights law Property rights Law 050602 political science & public administration Economics media_common |
Zdroj: | Politics, Philosophy & Economics. 15:405-423 |
ISSN: | 1741-3060 1470-594X |
DOI: | 10.1177/1470594x16650541 |
Popis: | Scholars in philosophy, political science, and the policy community have recently advocated for a ‘sticks and carrots’, or conditional-coercion, approach to human rights violations. On this model, rights violators (usually states) are conceived of as rational agents who should be rewarded for good behavior and punished for bad behavior by other states seeking to improve human rights abroad. External states concerned about human rights abroad should impose punishments against foreign rights violators, and these punitive measures should not be lifted until rights violations in target countries cease. Against these scholars, I argue that the conditional-coercion model is mistaken. In this article, I explicate the ‘sticks and carrots’ approach to human rights, criticize it on both theoretical and empirical grounds, and suggest an alternative approach that I term rights diagnostics. The model I propose is sensitive to the internal political struggles in rights violating states and the incentive structures faced by rights violators. This model takes account of relevant empirical evidence on the role of external coercion and inducements in producing institutional change. I conclude by sketching an institutional design that would potentially implement ‘rights diagnostics’ policy.1 |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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