A competitive carbon emissions scheme with hybrid fiscal incentives: The evidence from a taxi industry
| Autor: | Kongyi Luo, Ziqiao Yin, Yang Liu, Liyan Han |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Public economics
020209 energy media_common.quotation_subject chemistry.chemical_element 02 engineering and technology 010501 environmental sciences Management Monitoring Policy and Law 01 natural sciences Recession Transport economics General Energy Incentive chemistry Coase theorem Greenhouse gas 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Pigou effect Economics Revenue Carbon Industrial organization 0105 earth and related environmental sciences media_common |
| Zdroj: | Energy Policy. 102:414-422 |
| ISSN: | 0301-4215 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.enpol.2016.12.038 |
| Popis: | As two major approaches to reduce carbon emissions, command-and-control instruments and market-based carbon trading systems have their own weaknesses. Our paper first proposes a type of endogenous equilibrium methodology to dynamically derive the industrial carbon emissions standards. At the equilibrium, the sum of all carbon assets and liabilities is zero in the considered industry. Moreover, the standards fall over time with low-carbon technological advance. Most importantly, combining Pigou's and Coase's ideas, we construct a fiscal instrument accounting for both carbon taxes and allowances based on the dynamically improved emissions standards and carbon trading prices. This “No revenue for government” method implements a self-operated ecology for carbon trading market. Finally, considering the “Waterloo” recession of carbon prices, we introduce an adjustment factor into the model, which generates a negative-feedback mechanism with carbon prices. To support our idea, we present the application to Beijing taxi industry in detail and raise relative policy implications based on the evidence. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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