No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
| Autor: | Youngsub Chun, Duygu Yengin |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
education.field_of_study Queueing theory Computer science Applied Mathematics 05 social sciences Population Monotonic function Characterization (mathematics) Strategy proofness Solidarity Order (exchange) 0502 economics and business 050206 economic theory Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction education Mathematical economics 050205 econometrics |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Mathematical Economics. 88:87-97 |
| ISSN: | 0304-4068 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.03.003 |
| Popis: | Given a group of agents, the queueing problem is concerned with finding the order to serve agents and the monetary transfers they should receive. In this paper, we characterize interesting subfamilies of the VCG mechanisms by investigating the implications of either no-envy or solidarity requirements. First, we present a characterization of the strategy-proofand envy-freemechanisms. Next, we present characterizations of VCG mechanisms satisfying one of two different formulations of cost monotonicity or population monotonicity. Finally, we show that among the envy-free and strategy-proof mechanisms, the only ones that satisfy one of two formulations of cost monotonicity or population monotonicity are extensions of the pivotal or the reward-based pivotal mechanisms. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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