Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games
| Autor: | Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, Richard P. McLean |
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| Rok vydání: | 2014 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Correlated equilibrium Mathematical optimization Proper equilibrium Trembling hand perfect equilibrium TheoryofComputation_GENERAL symbols.namesake Nash equilibrium Equilibrium selection Best response Economics symbols Folk theorem Epsilon-equilibrium General Economics Econometrics and Finance Mathematical economics |
| Zdroj: | Theoretical Economics. 9:555-582 |
| ISSN: | 1933-6837 |
| DOI: | 10.3982/te1178 |
| Popis: | We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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