Back-Channel Representation: A Study of the Strategic Communication of Senators with the US Department of Labor

Autor:	Melinda N. Ritchie
Rok vydání:	2018
Předmět:	021110 strategic defence & security studies Sociology and Political Science business.industry media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Perspective (graphical) 0211 other engineering and technologies Face (sociological concept) Separation of powers 02 engineering and technology Public relations Public administration 0506 political science Representation (politics) Covert Political science Accountability 050602 political science & public administration Bureaucracy Strategic communication business media_common
Zdroj:	The Journal of Politics. 80:240-253
ISSN:	1468-2508 0022-3816
DOI:	10.1086/694395
Popis:	An underappreciated way members of Congress represent interests is by pursuing policy goals through their communication with the bureaucracy. I argue that the bureaucracy provides an alternative, covert way for cross-pressured legislators, who face diverging pressures from party leaders, interest groups, and subconstituencies, to satisfy conflicting interests. Using original data of senators’ communication with the US Department of Labor from 2005 to 2012 (109th through 112th Congresses), I show that, when faced with cross-pressures from party and constituency, senators strategically choose less visible, back-channel means for pursuing policy goals. These findings provide a new perspective on representation by demonstrating that legislators pursue policy goals outside of the legislative process in an effort to evade accountability.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::dca3c7d946583a146654ee9fa039e083 https://doi.org/10.1086/694395 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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