The Relationship Between Compensation, Motivation, And Earnings Management

Autor: Jennifer Blaskovich, Wendy W. Achilles, Terence J. Pitre
Rok vydání: 2013
Předmět:
Zdroj: Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR). 29:579
ISSN: 2157-8834
0892-7626
DOI: 10.19030/jabr.v29i2.7658
Popis: Regulators and investors remain concerned with earnings management and its effect on the reliability of accounting information. Agency literature suggests that a lack of compensation incentives (i.e., bonus payments) can decreasebut not completely eliminate--earnings management behavior, while theory from psychology suggests that individuals may be motivated to manage earnings, regardless of compensation. Consequently, we examine how compensation incentives and motivation (intrinsic versus extrinsic) affect earnings management behavior. We hypothesize and find that when compensation is linked to firm performance, managers make income increasing (decreasing) decisions when current earnings are below (above) analysts forecasts. We find that in the absence of compensation incentives, managers make earnings increasing decisions when current earnings are below analysts forecasts, but they do not make earnings decreasing decisions when current earnings are above analysts forecasts. Finally and most importantly we show that managers who possess strong extrinsic motivation are more likely to manage earnings upwards to reach targets in the absence of compensation possibly because it helps satisfy their competitive spirit and need for recognition. However when current earnings are above the target (analysts forecasts), managers are not compelled to manage earnings as this drive has already been satisfied.
Databáze: OpenAIRE