| Popis: |
Since the beginning of the second Chechen war in 1999 and the onset of the Putin government in Russia, the freedom given to the Russian press has declined. At the same time, Chechen violence targeting the Russian military and civilians and the popularity of Vladimir Putin has increased. The two events are connected. The press gave the Chechen rebels a means, albeit one-sided, to communicate with the Russian people. Restrictions on the press limited the Chechen's ability to convey their plight, at the hands of the Russian military, to the Russian populace. The Chechen reaction was increased violence to gain the attention of the Russian people. Vladimir Putin used the restrictions on the press to create the sense of a strong government. Without reports focusing on the atrocities in Chechnya, the Russians were left with a faceless, voiceless monster that only the Putin government could seemingly defeat. This thesis tracks this trend through the evolution of Chechen terror acts in Moscow, beginning with large-scale hostage taking events in Dubrovka during the fall of 2002, when the press presented both sides. This thesis ends with the large-scale hostage taking event in Beslan in 2004, when the press was largely silent on the motivations of the hostage takers. These acts impress a feeling of terror on the Russian nation, but the reporting gives nothing in the way of explanation. The resolution of these acts gives a sense of security to the Russian populace at the hands of Vladimir Putin. |
