Natural resource rents and internal conflicts: Can decentralization lift the curse?

Autor:	Christian Lessmann, Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, Gunther Markwardt
Rok vydání:	2018
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Curse Lift (data mining) media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Economic rent International economics Decentralization Natural resource Politics 0502 economics and business Economics 050207 economics Internal conflict 050205 econometrics Panel data media_common
Zdroj:	Economic Systems. 42:186-205
ISSN:	0939-3625
DOI:	10.1016/j.ecosys.2017.05.009
Popis:	We study how natural resource rents affect the risk of internal conflict within countries and how the federal structure of countries influences this relationship. Natural resource abundance may induce excessive rent-seeking and thus increase the risk of internal conflict. Fiscal and political decentralization as an institutional arrangement for rent-sharing and political codetermination of regions within a country may limit the destructive effect of natural resource rents on internal stability. Using cross-country and panel data from more than 90 countries covering the period 1984–2004, we find evidence that natural resource rents indeed increase the risk of internal conflict, but this relationship is significantly mitigated by political decentralization.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d6518d2b38f3a74e83c5b32ddcf6c818 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecosys.2017.05.009 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full Text from ScienceDirect