Who benefits from insider regulation?
| Autor: | Klaus Schredelseker, Florian Hauser |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Agent-based model
Attractiveness Finance Economics and Econometrics 050208 finance business.industry 05 social sciences Financial market Monetary economics Market microstructure Profit (economics) Insider Information asymmetry 0502 economics and business Economics Insider trading 050207 economics business |
| Zdroj: | The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. 68:203-210 |
| ISSN: | 1062-9769 |
| Popis: | The scope of insider trading regulation in financial markets is to enhance fairness by reducing information asymmetry. Even if this comes at the price of lower informational efficiency, it is regarded to increase the attractiveness of the market by protecting low-informed investors. Using agent-based modeling, we show that this argument does not hold. Our results indicate that very well informed traders profit the most from prohibiting informed insider trading, while low-informed traders hardly experience any benefit at all or may even be worse off than without inside regulation. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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