Nordic congestion's arrangement as a model for Europe? Physical constraints vs. economic incentives
| Autor: | Jean-Michel Glachant, Virginie Pignon |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2005 |
| Předmět: |
Flexibility (engineering)
Sociology and Political Science SIGNAL (programming language) Management Monitoring Policy and Law Development Microeconomics Variable (computer science) Incentive Opportunism Economics Business and International Management Set (psychology) Constraint (mathematics) Externality |
| Zdroj: | Utilities Policy. 13:153-162 |
| ISSN: | 0957-1787 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jup.2004.12.009 |
| Popis: | Congestion on power grids seems a physical reality, a “hard” fact easy to check. Our paper models a different idea: congestion signal may be distorted by transmission system operators (TSOs). Indeed, congestion signals are not physical data but “home made” conventions directly set by the TSOs in charge of the security of the system. These security norms are not stable and invariable because some flexibility is needed by the very nature of the power flows and because lines capacity limits are not constant. TSOs, therefore, define the congestion signal on a variable, complex and non-transparent constraint and may manipulate it for monetary purposes or for other personal agenda. In Nordic countries the coexistence of two congestion management methods in a “Light Handed Regulation” framework makes this opportunistic behaviour even more likely. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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