Autor:	Albert Casullo
Rok vydání:	2008
Předmět:	Philosophy A priori and a posteriori Defeasible estate Experiential learning Epistemology
Zdroj:	The Philosophical Quarterly. 58:336-343
ISSN:	1467-9213 0031-8094
DOI:	10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.512.x
Popis:	Joshua Thurow offers a defence of the claim that if a belief is defeasible by non-experiential evidence then it is defeasible by experiential evidence. He responds to an objection which I make against this claim, and offers two arguments in support of his own position. I show that Thurow's response misconstrues my objection, and that his supporting arguments fall short of their goal.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d0ce9ef8aed36cc1dceb72758f3a1dd6 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.512.x Zobrazit plný text záznamu