An Efficient Memory Zeroization Technique Under Side-Channel Attacks
| Autor: | Ankush Srivastava, Prokash Ghosh |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Authentication
Hardware_MEMORYSTRUCTURES business.industry Computer science 020208 electrical & electronic engineering Automotive industry 02 engineering and technology 020202 computer hardware & architecture Memory management Embedded system Data remanence 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Wireless System on a chip Side channel attack business Reboot |
| Zdroj: | VLSI Design |
| DOI: | 10.1109/vlsid.2019.00032 |
| Popis: | Protection of secured data content in volatile memories (processor caches, embedded RAMs etc) is essential in networking, wireless, automotive and other embedded secure applications. It is utmost important to protect secret data, like authentication credentials, cryptographic keys etc., stored over volatile memories which can be hacked during normal device operations. Several security attacks like cold boot, disclosure attack, data remanence, physical attack, cache attack etc. can extract the cryptographic keys or secure data from volatile memories of the system. The content protection of memory is typically done by assuring data deletion in minimum possible time to minimize data remanence effects. In today's state-of-the-art SoCs, dedicated hardwares are used to functionally erase the private memory contents in case of security violations. This paper, in general, proposes a novel approach of using existing memory built-in-self-test (MBIST) hardware to zeroize (initialize memory to all zeros) on-chip memory contents before it is being hacked either through different side channels or secuirty attacks. Our results show that the proposed MBIST based content zeroization approach is substantially faster than conventional techniques. By adopting the proposed approach, functional hardware requirement for memory zeroization can be waived. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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