Dissecting practical intelligence theory
| Autor: | Linda S. Gottfredson |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2003 |
| Předmět: |
Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
Tacit knowledge Existential quantification Theory of multiple intelligences Developmental and Educational Psychology Construct validity Experimental and Cognitive Psychology Cognition Everyday life Procedural knowledge Psychology Competence (human resources) Cognitive psychology |
| Zdroj: | Intelligence. 31:343-397 |
| ISSN: | 0160-2896 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/s0160-2896(02)00085-5 |
| Popis: | Sternberg et al. [Sternberg, R. J., Forsythe, G. B., Hedlund, J., Horvath, J. A., Wagner, R. K., Williams, W. M., Snook, S. A., Grigorenko, E. L. (2000). Practical intelligence in everyday life. New York: Cambridge University Press] review the theoretical and empirical supports for their bold claim that there exists a general factor of practical intelligence that is distinct from “academic intelligence” (g) and which predicts future success as well as g, if not better. The evidence collapses, however, upon close examination. Their two key theoretical propositions are made plausible only by ignoring the considerable evidence contradicting them. Their six key empirical claims rest primarily on the illusion of evidence, which is enhanced by the selective reporting of results. Their small set of usually poorly documented studies on the correlates of tacit knowledge (the “important aspect of practical intelligence”) in five occupations cannot, whatever the results, do what the work is said to have done—dethroned g as the only highly general mental ability or intelligence. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full Text from ScienceDirect