A NOTE ON THE LARGE-FIRM MATCHING MODEL: CAN A NONBINDING MINIMUM WAGE REDUCE WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT?

Autor:	Alexandre Janiak, Sofia Bauducco
Rok vydání:	2016
Předmět:	Microeconomics Economics and Econometrics Matching (statistics) Labour economics 0502 economics and business 05 social sciences Economics Public policy 050207 economics Minimum wage 050205 econometrics
Zdroj:	Macroeconomic Dynamics. 21:2158-2169
ISSN:	1469-8056 1365-1005
DOI:	10.1017/s1365100516000067
Popis:	We show that, in the large-firm search model, employment may decrease even when the level of the introduced minimum wage lies below the equilibrium wage of the laissez-faire economy. Wages also decrease in the presence of the minimum wage. The argument is based on multiple equilibria and the idea that, in a large-firm context, the representative firm may choose to overemploy workers in order to renegotiate lower wages.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ce4a94ccb8f6b20a738d3a191961a2a6 https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100516000067 Zobrazit plný text záznamu