| Popis: |
This chapter explores how revelation functions in German Idealism, especially in the case of G. W. F Hegel (1770–1831) and F. W. J. Schelling (1775–1854), both of whom were hospitable to the idea of revelation in a way that J. G. Fichte (1762–1814) was not. Against the background of a general questioning of the standard theistic account of revelation, and of Fichte’s violent rejection of it and Kant’s moral reduction, both Hegel and Schelling attempted to revise revelation to take into account the dynamic self-manifesting character of the divine such that, at the very least, the creation of nature and human being is not accidental. After a synopsis of the development of the thought of each, the chapter focuses on representative texts: Hegel’s Phenomenology (1807) and Schelling’s Philosophie der Offenbarung (1841–1842). While structurally speaking in their philosophies of revelation Hegel and Schelling have much in common, there is much that divides them both methodologically and substantively. When it comes to explaining revelation, Hegel is confident in a way that Schelling is not. When it comes to register, in the case of Hegel the register is reason, in the case of Schelling, will. Finally, when it comes to constructing the relation between God and world, Hegel emphasizes their logical and ontological reciprocity, whereas Schelling asserts a measure of independence of God from the world, even if the world makes a real difference to a Trinitarian God who can no longer be thought to be self-sufficient without remainder. |
