Judicial independence and refugee flights

Autor:	Saadet Ulasoglu Imamoglu
Rok vydání:	2022
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Political Science and International Relations
Zdroj:	Conflict Management and Peace Science. 40:111-133
ISSN:	1549-9219 0738-8942
DOI:	10.1177/07388942211072433
Popis:	Recent studies suggest that a lack of judicial independence increases the risk of violent action, diminishing the incentives to solve disputes peacefully. However, violent action is not the only option when judiciaries are under the control of the executive. I argue that individuals become refugees in countries with non-independent judiciaries, losing their hope that violations of rules by the executive or privileged groups will be tried fairly. Using data from 181 countries over the 1976–2015 period, I find evidence that the lack of judicial independence leads countries to produce more refugees than others.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ccc6f340ddc7261c1b829c8c5ab53914 https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211072433 Zobrazit plný text záznamu