An exchange economy can have an empty ?-core

Autor:	Charles Holly
Rok vydání:	1994
Předmět:	Large class Economics and Econometrics Core (game theory) Corollary Economics Exchange economy Extension (predicate logic) Mathematical economics
Zdroj:	Economic Theory. 4:453-461
ISSN:	1432-0479 0938-2259
Popis:	Yannelis has shown that under very mild conditions on preferences, a 2-agent exchange economy has a nonempty α-core [4, Corollary 4.2]. The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate that an exchange economy with three or more agents can have an empty α-core. Hence, Yannelis' result would not extend to three or more agents. Examples are provided with and without free disposal, and all preferences are described by linear utility functions. These results are compared with those of Scarf [3], who proved the existence of an α-core solution for a large class ofn-person games. The comparison is carried out on two levels. First, since Scarf [3] and Yannelis [4] use different definitions for the α-core of an exchange economy, we compare these definitions. Second, the present results show that a natural extension of Scarf's theorem forn-person games fails if certain feasibility constraints are incorporated.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cc98e13eaed583bd47890d201c419bac https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01215382 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF