Incentive Management on Activated Conservation of Historic Buildings in China
Autor: | Sarana Photchanachan, Jiayao Zhao |
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Rok vydání: | 2021 |
Předmět: | |
Zdroj: | Modern Economy. 12:990-1003 |
ISSN: | 2152-7261 2152-7245 |
DOI: | 10.4236/me.2021.125051 |
Popis: | With the current economic and social development of the country, the conservation of historic buildings has brought new issues; historic buildings need to be conserved and activated. Effective incentive management to promote economic development and the preservation of historic buildings is an important issue. Through the study of analysis strategy of the participants and decision-making of urban historic buildings conservation, game theory explains incentive management from a historic buildings activated conservation development perspective of the demand and supply side design to conserve the historic buildings. Based on the three major stakeholders in the conservation process of historic buildings, an evolutionary game model of “government-developers” and “government-the people” is constructed to study the strategy selection behaviors of the government in the implementation of incentive policies. Developers and the people put forward the strategy suggestions to achieve optimal equilibrium. The results show that the strategy choice is affected by the initial state and parameters of the game. The government through subsidies, market mechanism intervention measures guides of developers to activate and protect historic buildings; The government promotes public awareness through economic encouragement and propaganda, participates in the conservation of historic buildings, and finally realizes the win-win situation of the three parties. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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