Once More Unto the Breach: Type B Physicalism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Epistemic Gap
| Autor: | Janet Levin |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
media_common.quotation_subject
Philosophy 05 social sciences 06 humanities and the arts Type (model theory) 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Experiential learning Physicalism 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Physical Concepts Identity (philosophy) 060302 philosophy Introspection 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences media_common Skepticism |
| Zdroj: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 97:57-71 |
| ISSN: | 1471-6828 0004-8402 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/00048402.2018.1447587 |
| Popis: | Type B, or a posteriori, physicalism is the view that phenomenal-physical identity statements can be necessarily true, even though they cannot be known a priori—and that the key to understanding their status is to understand the special features of our phenomenal concepts, those concepts of our experiential states acquired through introspection. This view was once regarded as a promising response to anti-physicalist arguments that maintain that an epistemic gap between phenomenal and physical concepts entails that phenomenal and physical properties are distinct. More recently, however, many physicalists have lost confidence in the view, and have proposed less promising defences of physicalism—or have become outright sceptical about its prospects. I argue here that these physicalists have underestimated the resources of Type B physicalism and are thereby retreating too quickly—or fighting battles that have already been won. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|