Prehire Screening and Subjective Performance Evaluations

Autor:	Bin R. Chen, Sanxi Li
Rok vydání:	2018
Předmět:	Scheme (programming language) Actuarial science Computer science Strategy and Management Interim 0502 economics and business 05 social sciences Principal (computer security) 050201 accounting 050207 economics Management Science and Operations Research computer computer.programming_language
Zdroj:	Management Science. 64:4953-4965
ISSN:	1526-5501 0025-1909
Popis:	We study a two-stage model in which the agent’s ability is initially unknown to any party, but the principal can choose a prehire screening scheme to discover the agent’s ability before offering a contract. Perfect screening enables the principal to fine-tune the contract to the agent’s ability, but it also prevents her from enforcing a contract that is contingent on subjective interim performance measures. Given that interim performance measures are critical for motivating first-stage effort, the principal may benefit from adopting no screening or partial screening. When partial screening is employed, the halo effect—a commonly observed bias in subjective evaluation practices—emerges in the equilibrium. This paper was accepted by Shivaram Rajgopal, accounting.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c9c0ba17d51fe2d04bf30c3774c9ea81 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2860 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF