Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: An axiomatic approach
| Autor: | Ehud Lehrer, Shiri Alon |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Bargaining problem Matching (statistics) ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION Compromise media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Axiomatic system Competitive equilibrium ComputingMethodologies_ARTIFICIALINTELLIGENCE 0502 economics and business Arbitration Economics 050206 economic theory 050207 economics Mathematical economics Preference (economics) Finance Axiom media_common |
| Zdroj: | Games and Economic Behavior. 118:60-71 |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.006 |
| Popis: | The paper introduces an axiomatic characterization of a solution to bargaining problems. Bargaining problems are specified by: (a) the preference relations of the bargaining parties (b) resources that are the subject of bargaining, and (c) a pre-specified disagreement bundle for each party that would result if bargaining fails. The approach is ordinal in that parties' preferences are over bundles of goods and do not imply any risk attitudes. The resulting solution is accordingly independent of the specific utilities chosen to represent parties' preferences. We propose axioms that characterize a solution matching each bargaining problem with an exchange economy, and assigning the set of equilibrium allocations corresponding to one equilibrium price vector of that economy. The axioms describe a solution that results from an impartial arbitration process, expressing the view that arbitration is a natural method to settle disputes in which agents have conflicting interests, but can all gain from compromise. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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