No microphysical causation? No problem: selective causal skepticism and the structure of completeness-based arguments for physicalism
| Autor: | Matthew C. Haug |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Special sciences
Philosophy of science media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences General Social Sciences 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Causal closure Physicalism 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Philosophy Argument Completeness (order theory) 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Causation Skepticism media_common Mathematics |
| Zdroj: | Synthese. 196:1187-1208 |
| ISSN: | 1573-0964 0039-7857 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11229-017-1519-4 |
| Popis: | A number of philosophers have argued that causation is not an objective feature of the microphysical world but rather is a perspectival phenomenon that holds only between “coarse-grained” entities such as those that figure in the special sciences. This view seems to pose a problem for arguments for physicalism that rely on the alleged causal completeness of physics. In this paper, I address this problem by arguing that the completeness of physics has two components, only one of which is causal. These two components of completeness can be used in an argument for physicalism that is supported by strong inductive evidence even in the absence of microphysical causation. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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