An Agenda-Setting Theory of Electoral Competition
| Autor: | Tiberiu Dragu, Xiaochen Fan |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Sociology and Political Science Salience (language) Public economics 05 social sciences Foundation (evidence) Agenda-setting theory Adversary Majoritarian representation 0506 political science Competition (economics) Incentive Political economy Political science 0502 economics and business 050602 political science & public administration Position (finance) 050207 economics |
| Zdroj: | The Journal of Politics. 78:1170-1183 |
| ISSN: | 1468-2508 0022-3816 |
| DOI: | 10.1086/686310 |
| Popis: | The strategy of parties regarding which issues to emphasize during electoral campaigns is an important aspect of electoral competition. In this article, we advance research on electoral competition by developing a multidimensional model of electoral competition in which parties compete for electoral support by raising the electoral salience of position issues. We show that parties have incentives to advertise an issue on which the opponent has a more popular position or an issue on which neither party has electoral advantage. We also show that the party with the lower equilibrium vote share prefers to emphasize more controversial issues, while the party with the higher equilibrium vote share prefers to emphasize more consensual issues on its electoral agenda. The analysis provides a theoretical foundation for moving toward a more complete understanding of the content of campaign communication on issues on which voters disagree about which policies ought to be implemented. It also provides novel empirical ... |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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