Reasoning with Quantified Modal Premises: Some Everyday Inferences May Be Logically Invalid

Autor: Ana Cristina Quelhas, Celia Maria Rasga, Philip Nicholas Johnson-Laird
Rok vydání: 2022
DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/whv36
Popis: We present a theory of quantified modal reasoning, and four studies of individuals’ spontaneous conclusions that test its predictions. From premises, such as: All of those artists are businessmen, Paulo is possibly one of those artists, participants tended to conclude: Paulo is possibly a businessman (Experiment 1). This inference follows as necessary from an intuitive mental model that represents, say, three artists who are each businessmen, and Paulo as one of the artists. Deliberation can lead to a model in which Paulo is not an artist, which is consistent with the presupposition of the premise about him, but a possibility follows provided it holds in at least one correct model. Individuals tend to infer the model theory’s predicted conclusions about possibilities even when standard modal logics evaluate them as invalid (Experiment 2). The theory also predicts common errors, such as inferences of categorical conclusions from premises about possibilities (Experiment 3) and even from premises for modal syllogisms (Experiment 4). The paper concludes with a general account of quantified modal reasoning.
Databáze: OpenAIRE