Some observations on power and property rights in the inland fisheries of Bangladesh

Autor:	Kazi Ali Toufique
Rok vydání:	1997
Předmět:	Transaction cost Power (social and political) Fishery Economics and Econometrics Sociology and Political Science Overfishing Property rights Geography Planning and Development Fishing Economics Differential (mechanical device) Development Element (criminal law)
Zdroj:	World Development. 25:457-467
ISSN:	0305-750X
DOI:	10.1016/s0305-750x(96)00108-8
Popis:	This paper examines the causes behind the failure of the fishermen to establish property rights over fishing grounds in the inland fisheries of Bangladesh. Property rights are eventually transferred to socially powerful agents called the lessees who are not part of the fishing community. Differential costs of establishing and maintaining property rights have been observed as the key element behind the transfer of rights. This differential cost stems from power asymmetries and consequently more rent is generally realizable by the lessees. Differential capacity to realize rent creates the potential for an exchange of rights between them. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c237db56aefaada8aa8c17537b94fd5d https://doi.org/10.1016/s0305-750x(96)00108-8 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full Text from ScienceDirect