Three arguments for an individual concept analysis of specificational sentences
| Autor: | Martina Martinović, Karlos Arregi, Itamar Francez |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
050101 languages & linguistics
Linguistics and Language Philosophy 05 social sciences 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Syntax Language and Linguistics Predicate (grammar) Linguistics Philosophy of language 060302 philosophy Formal concept analysis 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences |
| Zdroj: | Natural Language & Linguistic Theory. 39:687-708 |
| ISSN: | 1573-0859 0167-806X |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11049-020-09491-x |
| Popis: | Higgins (1973) famously distinguished between predicational and specificational interpretations of copular sentences. Since then, the literature has debated whether specificational interpretations exist and, if so, what they are. This paper contributes to this debate by providing three new arguments for recognizing specificational interpretations, and against the view, prevalent in the syntactic literature, that sentences with allegedly specificational readings actually involve predicational readings and a structure of predicate inversion. Our arguments support Romero’s (2005) analysis of specificational readings as involving individual concepts. Our discussion also demonstrates that the question of the semantics of specification is entirely independent of the question of whether the syntax of specification involves inversion or not. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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