Autor:	N P Hughes
Rok vydání:	2017
Předmět:	Logic 05 social sciences Rationality 06 humanities and the arts 050905 science studies 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Epistemology Philosophy Argument 060302 philosophy Ontology Uniqueness 0509 other social sciences Social psychology Mathematics
Zdroj:	Erkenntnis. 84:57-75
ISSN:	1572-8420 0165-0106
DOI:	10.1007/s10670-017-9947-6
Popis:	I argue that it is epistemically permissible to believe that P when it is epistemically rational to believe that P. Unlike previous defenses of this claim, this argument is not vulnerable to the claim that permissibility is being confused with excusability.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c1b45d2c261bed9da355d5142d2812bb https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9947-6 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink