Strategic exploitation of a common-property resource under uncertainty
| Autor: | Leonard J. Mirman, Christos Koulovatianos, Elena Antoniadou |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Předmět: |
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Economics and Econometrics Class (computer programming) Computer science Reproduction (economics) Management Monitoring Policy and Law Microeconomics Common-pool resource symbols.namesake Resource (project management) Nash equilibrium symbols Construct (philosophy) Commons Game theory |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 65:28-39 |
| ISSN: | 0095-0696 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jeem.2012.05.005 |
| Popis: | We construct a game of noncooperative common-resource exploitation which delivers analytical solutions for its symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. We examine how introducing uncertainty to the natural law of resource reproduction affects strategic exploitation. We show that the commons problem is always present in our example and we identify cases in which increases in risk amplify or mitigate the commons problem. For a specific class of games which imply Markov-perfect strategies that are linear in the resource stock (our example belongs to this class), we provide general results on how payoff-function features affect the responsiveness of exploitation strategies to changes in riskiness. These broader characterizations of games which imply linear strategies (appearing in an Online Appendix) can be useful in future work, given the technical difficulties that may arise from the possible nonlinearity of Markov-perfect strategies in more general settings. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full Text from ScienceDirect