Size versus scope: on the trade-off facing economic unions

Autor:	Gerald Willmann, Oliver Lorz
Rok vydání:	2012
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Scope (project management) International economics Public choice Outcome (game theory) Economic union Margin (finance) Accounting Strategic delegation Economics Fiscal federalism Economic system Finance Public finance
Zdroj:	International Tax and Public Finance. 20:247-267
ISSN:	1573-6970 0927-5940
DOI:	10.1007/s10797-012-9223-2
Popis:	This paper analyzes the relationship between the size of an economic union and the degree of policy centralization. We consider a political economy setting in which elected representatives bargain over the degree of centralization within the union. In our model, strategic delegation affects the identity of the representatives, and hence the equilibrium policy outcome. We show that the relationship between the extensive and the intensive margin of centralization may be non-monotonic: Up to a certain threshold a larger size implies deeper integration, whereas beyond that threshold centralization declines with further increases in size. We also show that freezing the level of centralization and associate memberships can mitigate this trade-off.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::bfd299269c2d7e17dc54faca5828d556 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-012-9223-2 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink