Setup: Why and How the U.S. Air Force Lost in Vietnam
Autor: | Earl H. Tilford |
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Rok vydání: | 1991 |
Předmět: | |
Zdroj: | Armed Forces & Society. 17:327-342 |
ISSN: | 1556-0848 0095-327X |
DOI: | 10.1177/0095327x9101700301 |
Popis: | In terms of resources allocated, the Vietnam War was primarily an air war. Approximately half the $200 billion spent on the war supported aerial operations; 8 million tons of bombs fell and over 8,500 aircraft were lost between 1961 and 1975. For all that, while air power was occasionally pivotal, it was never decisive, and America's defeat in Vietnam can be construed as a defeat for air power. The failure of air power resulted from deficiencies inherent in doctrine and weaknesses in leadership. For a variety of reasons, the Air Force, which dropped over 6 million tons of bombs, has not faced up to the implications of its defeat. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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