Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald’s maxmin preferences

Autor:	Nicholas C. Yannelis, Zhiwei Liu
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Persuasion Information asymmetry Economy Incentive compatibility Order (exchange) media_common.quotation_subject Bayesian probability Economics Set (psychology) media_common Public finance
Zdroj:	Economic Theory. 72:801-833
ISSN:	1432-0479 0938-2259
Popis:	To justify the use of Wald’s maxmin preferences in an asymmetric information economy, we introduce a mechanism designer who can convince/persuade agents to adopt Wald’s maxmin preferences. We show that more efficient and individually rational allocations become incentive compatible if the mechanism designer persuades agents to use Wald’s maxmin preferences instead of Bayesian preferences. Thus, we justify the Wald’s maxmin preferences by showing that agents can be persuaded to use them in order to enlarge the set of efficient, individually rational and incentive compatible allocations.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::bbe1640175853a6b66e0948c57b5cc37 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01364-7 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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