Economic Shocks and Populism: The Political Implications of Reference-Dependent Preferences
| Autor: | Guido Tabellini, Fausto Panunzi, Nicola Pavoni |
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| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
History
Polymers and Plastics Public economics Redistribution (cultural anthropology) International taxation Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering Competition (economics) Populism Shock (economics) Prospect theory Multinational corporation Economics Survey data collection Business and International Management |
| Zdroj: | SSRN Electronic Journal. |
| ISSN: | 1556-5068 |
| DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.3680459 |
| Popis: | This paper studies electoral competition over redistributive taxes between a safe incumbent and a risky opponent. As in prospect theory, economically disappointed voters become risk lovers, and hence are attracted by the more risky candidate. We show that, after a large adverse economic shock, the equilibrium can display policy divergence: the intrinsically more risky candidate proposes lower taxes and is supported by a coalition of very rich and very disappointed voters, while the safe candidate proposes higher taxes. This can explain why new populist parties are often supported by economically dissatisfied voters and yet they run on economic policy platforms of low redistribution. We show that survey data on the German SOEP are consistent with our theoretical predictions on voters’ behavior. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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