Temperance and Epistemic Purity in Plato’s Phaedo
| Autor: | Patricia Marechal |
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| Rok vydání: | 2023 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. 105:1-28 |
| ISSN: | 1613-0650 0003-9101 |
| DOI: | 10.1515/agph-2021-0047 |
| Popis: | In this paper I examine the moral psychology of the Phaedo and argue that the philosophical life in this dialogue is a temperate life, and that temperance consists in exercising epistemic discernment by actively withdrawing assent from incorrect evaluations the body inclines us to make. Philosophers deal with bodily affections by taking a correct epistemic stance. Exercising temperance thus understood is a necessary condition both for developing and strengthening rational capacities, and for fixing accurate beliefs about value. The purification philosophers strive for, and the purifying role of philosophy, should then be understood as a clarificatory act consisting in making one’s thoughts clear and withdrawing assent from erroneous evaluative content in our desires and pleasures. Along the way, I argue that philosophers must neither avoid situations and activities that cause bodily affections as much as possible, nor ignore or care little about them. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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