Interests, Information, and Minority Influence in Deliberation

Autor:	C. Daniel Myers
Rok vydání:	2017
Předmět:	Sociology and Political Science business.industry Process (engineering) media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 06 humanities and the arts Public relations 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Deliberation Outcome (game theory) Democracy 0506 political science Empirical research Argument Political science 060302 philosophy 050602 political science & public administration Minority influence Quality (business) Positive economics business media_common
Zdroj:	The Journal of Politics. 79:804-822
ISSN:	1468-2508 0022-3816
DOI:	10.1086/690304
Popis:	The ability of citizens to advance arguments and have them considered fairly is essential to the equality and epistemic quality of deliberative institutions. This article builds on game-theoretic models of strategic information transmission to offer a theory of how the interests that deliberators have in the outcome of deliberation can reduce the influence of some citizens in deliberative process. Specifically, this article argues that the influence of an argument depends on whether the deliberator making the argument is in the majority or minority in terms of her interests in the outcome of deliberation. An argument made by a member of the minority will be less influential than the same argument made by a member of the majority. We offer the first empirical test of this kind of model in realistic deliberative conditions using a laboratory experiment and a field experiment and find support for this theory.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b64707dfd7a6c8878be647a66df2edf0 https://doi.org/10.1086/690304 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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