The irrelevance of intentions to refer: demonstratives and demonstrations
| Autor: | Michael Devitt |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Demonstrative
Philosophy of mind Philosophy 05 social sciences Metaphysics Mistake 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Object (philosophy) 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Philosophy of language 060302 philosophy Alternative theory 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Relation (history of concept) |
| Zdroj: | Philosophical Studies. 179:995-1004 |
| ISSN: | 1573-0883 0031-8116 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11098-021-01682-5 |
| Popis: | According to Mario Gomez-Torrente in Roads to Reference, the reference of a demonstrative is fixed in an object by the speaker’s referential intentions (IRH). I argue that this is a mistake. First, I draw attention to a venerable alternative theory that Gomez-Torrente surprisingly overlooks: the reference is fixed in an object directly by a relation established in perceiving the object. Next I criticize IRH, arguing that it is implausible, redundant, and misleading. Finally, I present a theory of demonstrations that is like the alternative theory for demonstratives. For, though demonstrations do not determine the reference of demonstratives, they play an independent referential role which is important in explaining David Kaplan’s famous Carnap-Agnew example and many others including some of Gomez-Torrente’s. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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