The evolution of cooperation in spatial multigame with voluntary participation
| Autor: | Yijie Huang, Zhilong Deng, Zhi-Yang Gu, Jiwei Xu, Zhenghong Deng |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
education.field_of_study
General Mathematics Applied Mathematics media_common.quotation_subject Stochastic game Population General Physics and Astronomy Contrast (statistics) Statistical and Nonlinear Physics Social dilemma Temptation 01 natural sciences 010305 fluids & plasmas Dilemma Microeconomics 0103 physical sciences Economics 010306 general physics Set (psychology) education Diversity (business) media_common |
| Zdroj: | Chaos, Solitons & Fractals. 109:41-46 |
| ISSN: | 0960-0779 |
| Popis: | In the real life, we often simultaneously encounter various social dilemmas, which are also inclined to be voluntarily participated in, instead of previous assumption's compulsory participation in. Accounting on this realistic scenario, we have introduced the mechanism that the individuals have access to different payoff matrices corresponding to different social dilemmas to participate in the multigame with three strategies to choose, including cooperation, defection, going it alone. Furthermore, we set a proportion ψ/2 of the population to play the Prisoner's Dilemma, a proportion ψ/2 of the population to play Snowdrift and a proportion 1 − ψ of the population to play the weak Prisoner's Dilemma, which results in the fact that the mean payoff matrix returns to the basic weak PD. Though numerical simulations, we find that for the smaller temptation to defect, the cooperation can be enhanced by the diversity of the sucker's payoff in the multigame contrast to the basic case. In addition, when the contribution of sucker's payoff is larger or more players choose to play the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift, the cooperators become more dominated. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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