Embodying cognitive ethology
| Autor: | Helen L. Ma, Michael R. W. Dawson, Ruby S. Prinsen, Dana A. Hayward |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Theory & Psychology. 33:42-58 |
| ISSN: | 1461-7447 0959-3543 |
| DOI: | 10.1177/09593543221126165 |
| Popis: | Cognitive psychology considers the environment as providing information, not affecting fundamental information processes. Thus, cognitive psychology’s traditional paradigms study responses to precisely timed stimuli in controlled environments. However, new research demonstrates the environment does influence cognitive processes and offers cognitive psychology new methods. The authors examine one such proposal: cognitive ethology. Cognitive ethology improves cognitive psychology’s ecological validity through first drawing inspiration from robust phenomena in the real world, then moving into the lab to test those phenomena. To support such methods, cognitive ethologists appeal to embodied cognition, or 4E cognition, for its rich relationships between agents and environments. However, the authors note while cognitive ethology focuses on new methods (epistemology) inspired by embodied cognition, it preserves most traditional assumptions about cognitive processes (ontology). But embodied cognition—particularly its radical variants—also provides strong ontological challenges to cognitive psychology, which work against cognitive ethology. The authors argue cognitive ethology should align with the ontology of less radical embodied cognition, which produces epistemological implications, offering alternative methodologies. For example, cognitive ethology can explore differences between real-world and lab studies to fully understand how cognition depends on environments. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|