Reasoning with Unarticulated Thoughts

Autor: Eli Alshanetsky
Rok vydání: 2019
Zdroj: Articulating a Thought
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198785880.003.0006
Popis: This chapter looks closely at another important aspect of the articulation process: the kind of reasoning that we engage in when we articulate a thought. Although we often articulate our thoughts without engaging in any reasoning, a certain kind of reasoning does sometimes play an ancillary role in our assessment of a formulation. In articulating a thought, we are often cognizant of various attitudes that we have in reaction to it. The thought may seem true or false, hopeful or alarming, frivolous or serious, and so on. We reject formulations that do not support such attitudes in any way. This chapter shows that these attitudes pass through a kind of “normative filter”, or a rapid normative evaluation, and goes some way toward understanding the character of this evaluation using the previous account of implicit knowledge. Understanding how we reason with unarticulated thoughts can enhance our understanding of reasoning, more generally.
Databáze: OpenAIRE