Institutional checks and corruption: The effect of formal agenda access on governance

Autor:	William B. Heller, Oriol Roca-Sagalés, Andreas P. Kyriacou
Rok vydání:	2016
Předmět:	Sociology and Political Science Policy making Corruption Corporate governance media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Legislature Sample (statistics) Public administration 0506 political science Politics 0502 economics and business Collusion 050602 political science & public administration Economics 050207 economics Law and economics Panel data media_common
Zdroj:	European Journal of Political Research. 55:681-701
ISSN:	0304-4130
DOI:	10.1111/1475-6765.12155
Popis:	Legislative checks give whoever wields them influence over policy making. It is argued in this article that this influence implies the ability not only to affect legislative content, but also to direct public resources toward private ends. Rational politicians should use access to checks to make themselves better off – for example, by biasing policy toward private interests or creating opportunities to draw directly from the public till. Disincentives exist only to the extent that those able to observe or block corruption do not themselves benefit from it. Political opponents thus can use checks to stymie each other, but legislative checks controlled by political allies create conditions for collusion and corruption. Testing this claim against data from a sample of 84 countries, the results presented in this article show strong support for the hypothesised relationship between institutional checks and corruption.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b30e2545047430bd985b63a0a3c66e44 https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12155 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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