Strategic Effects of Regulatory Capital Requirements in Imperfect Banking Competition

Autor: Eva Schliephake, Roland Kirstein
Rok vydání: 2013
Předmět:
Zdroj: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 45:675-700
ISSN: 0022-2879
Popis: This paper analyses the competitive effects of capital requirement regulation on an oligo� polistic credit market. In the first stage, banks choose the structure of refinancing their assets, thereby making an imperfect commitment to a loan capacity as a function of the chosen degree of capitalization and the regulatory capital requirement. In the second stage, loan price competition takes place. It is shown that a capital requirement regulation may not only decrease the supply of credit through an increased marginal cost effect but can have an additional collusive enhancing effect resulting in even higher credit prices and increased profits for the banks.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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