| Autor: |
Ronald Sandler, John Basl |
| Rok vydání: |
2021 |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
The International Library of Environmental, Agricultural and Food Ethics ISBN: 9783030635220 |
| DOI: |
10.1007/978-3-030-63523-7_7 |
| Popis: |
A core question in practical ethics is ‘which entities do we need to consider in our decision-making?’ In this chapter we evaluate the justifications and motivations for defending species-membership views of human moral status. These are views on which human beings have a distinctive type of moral status grounded in their being human or possessing some property that almost perfectly correlates with being human. Many ethicists endorse species-membership views on moral status because they believe that moral status differences are needed to support widely held and purportedly well-justified beliefs about species differentiation in consideration and treatment. We argue against the need to adopt a species-membership or human-privilege view on moral status in order to justify species partiality in consideration and treatment. The sort of partiality with respect to consideration and treatment that motivates species-membership views is largely consistent with more egalitarian views about moral status, according to which an entity’s moral status depends on its own features, not the biological group to which it belongs. Given the traditional objections to species-membership views, to the extent that justified species partiality is consistent with alternative views of moral status, there is reason to reject the moral status significance of being human. |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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