The Historical Rarity of Foreign-Deployed Nuclear Weapon Crises
| Autor: | Paul C. Avey |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
021110 strategic
defence & security studies Sociology and Political Science 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies Host state 02 engineering and technology Nuclear weapon Computer security computer.software_genre 050601 international relations 0506 political science Scholarship Software deployment Political science Political economy Political Science and International Relations computer |
| Zdroj: | Security Studies. 27:89-119 |
| ISSN: | 1556-1852 0963-6412 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/09636412.2017.1360076 |
| Popis: | What are the strategic costs of foreign-deployed nuclear weapons? Thus far, scholars have focused primarily on the possible benefits: deterring adversaries and reassuring allies. There is little scholarship on the costs side of the cost–benefit equation. This article evaluates one potential cost: that deployments generate crises. I argue that such deployments have, historically, rarely resulted in crises because few deployments generate the level of threat necessary for the target of the deployment to forcefully act. Crises are likely only in the rare situations when the deployment is to an area that the rival views as vital and the deployment threatens to embolden the deploying or host state. I examine all foreign nuclear deployments to support these claims. The results have implications for ongoing debates on the effects of nuclear weapons and US nuclear deployments abroad today. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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