| Popis: |
The benefits of timely justice and rigorous judicial argument are impossible to overstate and hard to reconcile. In its struggle to deliver both, the Court of Justice of the European Union has initiated several reforms of its procedures. The so-called adjudicating orders arguably achieve the impossible: They fast-track recurring questions while safeguarding legal coherence. The present article unpacks this premise. It shows that seemingly inconsequential procedural amendments, often overlooked by scholars, give the Court full control over relevant European legal problems, and centralize its power. Concretely, the analysis introduces a typology of orders of the Court, to demonstrate the unique legal character of adjudicating orders. It then investigates their effects against the backdrop of manifold procedural reforms and institutional adjustments. The findings indicate that the greatest efficiency gains follow reforms, which the Court initiates and implements in relative anonymity. Moreover, the use of adjudicating orders increases in response to a sudden and considerable increase of legally similar preliminary references from one Member State. An equal increase of references from the courts of several Member States has no such effect. The findings suggest that the Court uses adjudicating orders to disengage from 'local' problems and unilaterally terminate the conversations with resolute national courts. Thereby, the preliminary reference procedure, envisaged and promoted as a collaborative tool, transforms into a centralized mechanism of speedy and authoritative dispute resolution. |
